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Abstract—Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-
ABE) is a promising encryption technology for secure data
sharing in cloud computing, in which data owner can fully control
access structure associated with a ciphertext. However, it brings
a major drawback which is known as key escrow problem, since
the decryption users’ secret keys are issued by an unconditionally
trusted third party (i.e. key authority). In addition, there is
another problem that most of CP-ABE schemes cannot express
arbitrary-state attributes. In this paper, we revisited attribute-
based data sharing scheme in order to solve the key escrow
issue and improve the ability of attribute expression in cloud
computing. An improved two-party key issuing protocol ensures
that neither key authority nor cloud service provider can generate
the whole secret keys of users individually. Moreover, the function
of weighted attribute is provided to enhance the attribute expres-
sion, which can not only extend attributes from binary state to
arbitrary states, but also reduce the complexity of access policy
associated with a ciphertext. Therefore, both ciphertext storage
and time cost in encryption are saved. The performance analysis
and security proof show that the proposed scheme is efficient to
securely achieve data sharing in cloud computing.
Keywords—Cloud computing, Data sharing, Attribute-based en-
cryption, Removing escrow, Weighted attribute.
I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing has become a research hot-spot due toits renowned advantages (e.g. convenience, high scalabil-
ity). One of the most promising cloud applications is online
data sharing, such as Online Social Networks with more than
one billion users [1]. Data owner (DO) stores large amounts
of data in cloud for ease of data sharing and cost saving on
local management. Meanwhile, cloud service provider (CSP)
becomes the manager of user’s data, and key authority (KA)
gets more power than ever. However, they cannot be fully
trusted since they may reveal DO’s data for benefits. Therefore,
how to securely and efficiently share user’s data becomes one
of the most challenges in cloud computing [2], [3].
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [4]–
[9] has been a useful encryption technology to solve the
challenging problem of secure data sharing. In CP-ABE,
user’s secret key is described by attributes, and ciphertext
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is associated with access structure. It enables DO to define
access structure over the universe of attribute. User can decrypt
ciphertext only if his attributes match the restrictions on
predefined access structure.
There will be several challenges if CP-ABE schemes are
directly applied in cloud system. Firstly, all users’ secret keys
are issued by an unconditionally trusted KA. It brings a major
drawback which is known as key escrow problem. By knowing
users’ secret keys, the KA can decrypt all ciphertext addressed
to specific users. However, the users may not allow the KA
with such a power.
Secondly, attribute expression is another challenge. At
present, most CP-ABE schemes [4]–[8], [10]–[12] cannot deal
with arbitrary-state attributes, but can only express binary
state about attributes: “satisfying” and “not-satisfying”. In this
paper, the weighted attribute is proposed which can not only
extend attributes from binary state to arbitrary states, but also
simplify access policy associated with a ciphertext. Thus the
storage cost of ciphertext and time cost in encryption can be
saved. We use an example to further illustrate our idea.
Suppose in a university, teachers are classified into teaching
assistant, lecturer, associated professor and full professor. We
distribute the weight of the attributes as 1, 2, 3, and 4, and are
denoted as “teacher: 1”, “teacher: 2”, “teacher: 3” and “teacher:
4”, respectively. The four attributes can be denoted by one
attribute which has just different weights. Especially, it can be
arbitrary-state attributes, such as “Teacher: teaching assistant,
lecturer, associate professor, full professor”. Furthermore, we
assume that an access policy is represented as: T f(“Lecturer”
OR “Associate Professor” OR “Full Professor”) AND “Male”g
and the existing CP-ABE schemes are executed on the form
of access policy T . If our proposed scheme is deployed, the T
can be improved as T 0 f“teacher: 2” AND “male”g, since the
attribute “teacher: 2” denotes the minimum level in the access
policy and includes f“teacher: 2”, “teacher: 3” “teacher: 4”g
by default. Therefore, the storage overhead of ciphertext and
computation complexity in encryption can be reduced. These
two structures are shown in Fig. 1. In addition, it can express
larger attribute space than ever under the same condition. For
example, if the attribute space and weighted set include n
elements, respectively, the proposed scheme can describe n2
different possibilities. In contrast, the previous schemes only
show 2n different possibilities.
A. Related Work
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [13] proposed fuzzy identity-
based encryption (IBE), which was the prototype of attribute-
based encryption (ABE). Then, two variants of ABE were
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Fig. 1. Two equivalent access structures of a ciphertext. T represents
a general access policy in the existing CP-ABE schemes. T 0 denotes an
improved access policy in the proposed scheme.
proposed: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [14] and CP-ABE [4],
[5], depending on how attributes and policy are associated
with a ciphertext and secret keys of users. Later, many CP-
ABE schemes with specific features have been presented. For
example, [12] presented a novel access control scheme in
cloud computing with efficient attribute and user revocation.
The computational overhead is significantly eliminated from
O(2N) to O(N) in user key generation by improving CP-
ABE construction, where N is the number of attributes. The
size of ciphertext is approximately reduced to 1/2. However,
the security of the scheme was given only with discussion.
At present, most CP-ABE schemes are constructed on
the architecture where a full trusted authority is required to
generate the whole secret keys of users with its master secret
key as input [4]–[6], [12]–[17]. Thus, the key escrow issue
is inherent such that the authority can decrypt all ciphertext
encrypted for users. Chase et al. [10] presented a distributed
KP-ABE scheme that solved the key escrow problem in a
multi-authority system. In this approach, all authorities, which
are not joined, are participating in the key generation protocol
in a distributed way, such that they cannot pool their data
and link multiple attribute sets belonging to the same user.
Because there is no centralized authority with master secret
information, all attribute authorities should communicate with
the other authorities in the system to create a user’s secret key.
But, a major disadvantage of this approach is the performance
degradation [18], [19]. It results in O(N2) communication
overhead on the system setup and on any rekeying phase,
and requires each user to store O(N2) additional auxiliary
key components in addition to the attribute keys, where N
is the number of authorities in the system. Then, Chow [20]
proposed an anonymous private key generation protocol in IBE
scheme where KA can issue private key to an authenticated
user without knowing the list of the user’s identities. It seems
that this approach can properly be used in ABE schemes if
attributes are treated as identities. However, this scheme cannot
be adopted for CP-ABE since the identity of user is a set of
attributes which is not public.
Until 2013, [11] provided an improving security data sharing
scheme based on the typical CP-ABE [4]. The key escrow
issue is resolved by using an escrow-free key issuing protocol
where the key generation center and the data storing center
work together to generate secret key for user. Therefore, the
computational cost in generating user’s secret key increases
since the protocol requires interactive computation between
the both parties.
Besides, Liu et al. [15], [16] presented fine-grained access
control scheme with attribute hierarchy, where [15] and [16]
are constructed based on [5] and [6], respectively. In these
two schemes, the attributes are divided into multiple levels to
achieve fine-grained access control for hierarchical attributes,
but the attributes can only express binary state as before.
Later, Fan et al. [17] proposed an arbitrary-state ABE to
solve the issue of the dynamic membership management in
an ABE scheme. In this paper, to express arbitrary-state
attributes, the traditional attributes are expanded to two parts:
attribute and value. For example, the traditional attributes
can be denoted as f“Doctor”,“Professor”,“Engineer”g. In this
scheme, the improved attributes are denoted as: fCareer:
“Doctor”,“Professor”,“Engineer”g, where “Career” represents
an attribute and “Doctor”,“Professor” and “Engineer” denote
values of the attribute “Career”. Accordingly, the computation
cost for attributes is more expensive than the traditional
schemes under the same number of attributes.
B. Our Contributions
In this study, based on [12], an attribute-based data sharing
scheme is proposed in cloud computing, which is denoted
as ciphertext-policy weighted ABE scheme with removing
escrow (or CP-WABE-RE, for short). It successfully resolves
two types of problems: key escrow and arbitrary-sate attribute
expression. The contributions of our scheme are as follows:
 we propose an improved key issuing protocol to resolve
the key escrow problem of CP-ABE in cloud computing.
The protocol can prevent KA and CSP from knowing
each other’s master secret key so that none of them can
create the whole secret keys of users individually. Thus,
the fully trusted KA can be semi-trusted in the proposed
scheme. In this case, data confidentiality and privacy can
be ensured.
 we present weighted attribute to enhance the expression
of attribute. The weighted attribute can not only express
arbitrary-state attributes instead of the traditional binary
state, but also reduce the complexity of access policy.
Thus the storage cost of ciphertext and computation
complexity in encryption can be reduced. Besides, it can
express larger attribute space than ever under the same
condition.
Note that there are significant improvements of our
scheme over [17] that the weighted attribute can simplify
access policy associated with a ciphertext (as the Fig. 1
shows) under the same ability of expression, which saves
the storage cost of ciphertext and time cost in encryption.
 we conduct and implement comprehensive experiment
for the proposed scheme. The simulation shows that
CP-WABE-RE scheme is efficient both in terms of
computation complexity and storage cost. In addition,
the security of CP-WABE-RE scheme is also proved
under the generic group model.
C. Organization
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows.
Section II discusses preliminaries which contain the related
3background. Section III proposes system model of CP-WABE-
RE scheme. In section IV, the concrete construction of CP-
WABE-RE scheme is presented. The theoretical analysis and
experimental simulation are given in section V. In section VI,
we provide security proof for the proposed scheme. Finally,
conclusions are presented in section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Access Structure
Let fP1; : : : ; Png be a set of parties. A collection A 
2fP1;:::;Png is monotone if 8B;C: if B 2 A and B  C
then C 2 A. An access structure (respectively, monotone
access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone col-
lection) A of non-empty subsets of fP1; : : : ; Png, i.e., A 
2fP1;:::;Pngnf;g. The sets in A are called authorization sets.
Otherwise, the sets are called unauthorization sets.
In the proposed scheme, the role of the parties is taken by
the attributes. Thus, A is going to include the authorized sets of
attributes. Generally, unless stated in another way, the scheme
uses an access structure which is a monotone access structure.
B. Bilinear Maps
Let G0 and GT be two groups of prime order p. The
generator of G0 is g. A bilinear mapping e^ : G0 G0 ! GT
satisfies the following properties:
 Bilinearity: For any u; v 2 G0 and a; b 2 Zp, it has
e^(ua; vb) = e^(u; v)ab.
 Non-degeneracy: There exists u; v 2 G0 such that
e^(u; v) 6= 1.
 Computability: For all u; v 2 G0, there is an efficient
computation e^(u; v).
C. Weighted Access Tree
Let T be a weighted access tree, where root node of the
tree is R. To facilitate description of the access tree, several
functions and terms are defined as follows.



 
	

 
 
 






 
 
 




 
 	
 

Fig. 2. An example of weighted access tree structure.
 x denotes a node of tree T . If x is a leaf node, it
denotes an attribute with weight. If x is a non-leaf node,
it denotes a threshold gate, such as “AND”, “OR”,“n-of-
m (n<m)”. For example, the nodes C and A denote a
threshold gate and an attribute respectively in Fig. 2.
 numx denotes the number of x’s children in T . For
example, numR = 2 in Fig. 2.
 kx denotes threshold value of node x, where 0 < kx 
numx. When kx = 1 and x is a non-leaf node, it is an
OR gate. When kx = numx and x is a non-leaf node, it
is an AND gate. In particular, if x is a leaf node, kx = 1.
For example, kR = 1 and kC = 2 denote an OR gate
and an AND gate respectively in Fig. 2.
 parent(x) represents the parent of the node x in T . For
example, parent(A) = C in Fig. 2.
 att(x) denotes an attribute associated with the leaf node
x in T .
 index(x) returns an unique value associated with the
node x, where the value is assigned to x for a given key
in an arbitrary manner.
 Tx denotes the sub-tree of T rooted at the node x. If a set
of weighted attribute S satisfies the access tree Tx, we
denote it as Tx(S) = 1. Tx(S) is recursively computed
as follows. If x is a non-leaf node, Tx(S) returns 1 if and
only if at least kx children return 1. If x is a leaf node,
then Tx(S) returns 1 if and only if the weight of attribute
!x from S must be greater than or equal to the weight
of the leaf node. That is weight(!x)  weight(att(x)).
In addition, Morillo et al. [21] proved that every weighted
value of the threshold access structure can be defined as a
natural number. Unless stated otherwise, the value of weight is
a natural number in this paper. In Fig. 2, the access policy is de-
noted as: f(“Teacher:1” And “Seniority:2”) OR “Teacher:3”g.
If one possesses attributes (“Teacher”, “Seniority”) with weight
(“1”, “2”), he can satisfy the tree in Fig. 2; If the other one
who possesses attribute (“Teacher”) with weight (“4”), he can
also satisfy the access tree.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, the system model and
framework of CP-WABE-RE scheme in cloud computing are
given, where the system consists of four types of entities:
KA, CSP, DO and Users. In addition, we provide the detailed
definition of CP-WABE-RE scheme.
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Fig. 3. System model of CP-WABE-RE scheme in cloud computing.
4Key Authority (KA). It is a semi-trusted entity in cloud
system. Namely, KA is honest-but-curious, which can honestly
perform the assigned tasks and return correct results. However,
it will collect as many sensitive contents as possible. In cloud
system, the entity accepts the users’ enrollment. Meanwhile, it
not only generates most part of system parameter, but is also
in charge of creating most part of secret key for each user.
Cloud Service Provider (CSP). It is the manager of cloud
servers. It is also a semi-trusted entity which provides many
services such as data storage, computation, and transmission.
To solve the key escrow problem, it generates parts of system
parameter and secret key for each user.
Data Owners (DO). They are owners of files to be stored in
cloud system. They are in charge of defining access structure
and executing data encryption operation. They also upload the
generated ciphertext to CSP.
Users. They want to access ciphertext stored in cloud
system. They download the ciphertext and execute the cor-
responding decryption operation.
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Fig. 4. System framework of CP-WABE-RE scheme.
Definition 1. (CP-WABE-RE): The proposed scheme contains
the following four phases:
Phase 1 : System Initialization: This phase includes
both algorithms: KA:Setup and CSP:Setup.
(1) KA:Setup(1) ! (PP1;MSK1): It is executed by
KA. The probabilistic operation inputs security parameter .
It returns public parameter PP1 and master secret key MSK1.
(2) CSP:Setup(1) ! (PP2;MSK2): This algorithm is
run by CSP. It inputs a security parameter  and generates
PP2 and MSK2.
The system public parameter is PP = fPP1;PP2g, while
the master secret key of system is MSK = fMSK1;MSK2g
stored by KA and CSP, respectively.
Phase 2 : Data Encryption: To improve efficiency of
encryption, DO first encrypts file M with content key ck
by using simple symmetric encryption algorithm, where file
ciphertext is denoted as Eck(M). Then, the content key ck is
encrypted by the following operation.
DO:Encrypt(PP; ck;A)! (CT): DO inputs PP, ck, and
an access policy A. It encrypts ck and outputs content key
ciphertext CT which implicitly contains A. Then, DO delivers
Eck(M) and CT to CSP.
Phase 3 : User Key Generation: This phase consists
of KA:KeyGen and CSP:KeyGen.
(1) KA:KeyGen(MSK1; S)! (SK1): KA inputs MSK1
and a set of weighted attributes S. It creates secret key SK1
described by S.
(2) In CSP:KeyGen, we propose an improved two-party
key issuing protocol to remove escrow. KA and CSP perform
the improved protocol with master secret keys of their own.
Thus, none of them can create the whole set of secret keys of
users individually. Meanwhile, we assume that KA does not
collude with CSP since they are honest as in [22] (otherwise,
they can obtain the secret keys of each user by sharing their
master secret keys).
CSP:KeyGen(MSK2) ! (SK2): CSP inputs MSK2
and the required information. It produces secret key SK2 by
executing the following key issuing protocol.
 KeyComKA$CSP(MSK1; IDt; r;MSK2) ! (SK2).
It is an interactive algorithm between KA and CSP. KA
inputs MSK1, a user identity IDt, and a personalized
secret r. CSP inputs MSK2 and IDt. At last, only CSP
generates a personalized key component SK2 for the
corresponding user.
Then, the user constructs the whole secret key SK with the
key components separately receiving from KA and CSP, i.e.
SK = fSK1;SK2g.
Phase 4 : Data Decryption: This phase contains both
algorithms: Users:Decrypt and Data:Decrypt. User first
downloads file ciphertext Eck(M) and content key ciphertext
CT from CSP. If he satisfies conditions, he can get content key
ck by calling Users:Decrypt algorithm. Then, he uses ck
to further decrypt file M by using Data:Decrypt operation.
(1) Users:Decrypt(PP;SK;CT) ! (ck): User inputs
PP, SK described by S, and CT which includes access policy
A. Only when the weighted attribute set S matches the access
policy A, the content key ck is obtained.
(2) Data:Decrypt(Eck(M); ck) ! (M): User inputs
Eck(M) and ck. Based on symmetric decryption algorithm,
it outputs file M .
IV. THE PROPOSED CP-WABE-RE SCHEME
In this section, we present the construction of CP-WABE-
RE system, including five procedures: system initialization,
new file creation (data encryption), new user authorization
(user key generation), data file access (data decryption), and
data file deletion. In addition, the revocation scheme of [11]
can be directly used in our proposed scheme. The reason is
described as below. The revocation scheme is performed in the
phase of data encryption. And the removing escrow is operated
in the phase of user key generation. Therefore, in [11], the
modification of removing escrow does not affect the use of
revocation scheme since they are run in different phases.
A. System Initialization
Let e^ : G0  G0 ! GT be a bilinear map, and G0
be bilinear group of prime order p with generator g. Let
5H : f0; 1g ! G0 be a hash function. For any i 2 Zp
and a set S = fs1; s2; : : : ; sm 2 Zpg, the Lagrange co-
efficient i;S =
Q
l2S;l 6=i(x   l)=(i   l). In addition, an
universe of attribute set A = fa1; : : : ; ang and a set of
weight W = f!1; : : : ; !ng(!1  : : :  !n) are defined.
Thus the system contains n2 weighted attributes which are
~A = fa1 : !1; : : : ; a1 : !n; : : : ; an : !1; : : : ; an : !ng, where
the higher hierarchy of attributes is used, the bigger weighted
value is distributed.
(1) KA:Setup(1): KA runs the algorithm which inputs
security parameter . Then, KA chooses random 1;  2 Zp
and computes h = g and u1 = e^(g; g)1 . Lastly, it obtains
PP1 and MSK1 as the formula (1):
PP1 = fG0; g; h; u1g; MSK1 = f1; g (1)
(2) CSP:Setup(1): CSP executes the operation which
inputs security parameter . Based on the , CSP chooses a
random number 2 2 Zp and calculates u2 = e^(g; g)2 . Then,
it sets PP2 and MSK2 as the formula (2):
PP2 = fu2g; MSK2 = f2g (2)
Finally, the public parameter and master secret key of system
are denoted as PP = fG0; g; h; u = u1 u2 = e^(g; g)g, where
 = 1 + 2, and MSK = ff1; g; f2gg.
B. New File Creation (Data Encryption)
Before file M is uploaded to CSP, DO processes the file
with the following steps: (1) DO picks a unique ID for file
M . (2) It encrypts M with content key ck by using symmetric
encryption method, where ck is chosen in a key space. The
file ciphertext is denoted as Eck(M), where Eck denotes a
symmetric encryption operation with the key ck. (3) It defines
an access structure T and encrypts the ck by running the
improved encryption operation. Then, content key ciphertext
CT is returned.
DO:Encrypt(PP; ck; T ): The improved algorithm is ex-
ecuted by DO which inputs PP, ck, and T . It outputs content
key ciphertext CT.
Firstly, a polynomial qx is selected for each node x (includ-
ing the leaf nodes) in T . From the root node R, the node’s
information of qx is randomly selected from top to bottom
manner. For each node x in T , degree of the polynomial dx
is set to kx   1, where kx is the threshold value.
Then, beginning from the root node R, DO sets qR(0) =
s(s 2 Zp), where s is randomly selected. And DO ran-
domly selects dR other points of the polynomial qR to define
it completely. For each non-root node x, it sets qx(0) =
qparent(x)(index(x)) and randomly chooses dx other points
to completely define qx. Meanwhile, each leaf node denotes a
weighted attribute.
In the access tree T , let Y be the set of leaf nodes, and
!i be the minimum weight of each leaf node, which is set by
DO. Then DO computes CT as the formula (3). Finally, DO
sends the integrated ciphertext fID;CT; Eck(M)g to CSP.
CT =
8>>><>>>:
T ; ~C = ck  e^(g; g)s; C = gs8><>:
8y 2 Y; i 2 [1; n] :
Cy = h
qy(0) H(att(y)) !is;
8j 2 (i; n]; Cy;j = H(att(y)) (!j !i)s
9>=>;
9>>>=>>>; (3)
To better understand, let us take the Fig. 2 for example here.
DO sets the polynomial qR(x) with degree 0 as qR(x) = s for
node R. At the same time, the polynomial qC(x) is set as
qC(x) = s+ crx with degree 1 where qR(u) = qC(0) = s and
cr is randomly chosen in Zp from node C. In addition, for
leaf nodes A, B, and D, they are respectively set as: qA(0) =
qC(x) = s + crx, qB(0) = qC(y) = s + cry, and qD(0) =
qR(z) = s.
C. New User Authorization (User Key Generation)
When a user wants to join the cloud system, KA first
accepts the user’s enrollment. If he is legal, KA authenticates
and assigns a set of weighted attributes S to the user in
accordance with his identity or role. Then, KA and CSP will
generate secret key SK for the user. The phase consists of
CSP:KeyGen and KA:KeyGen.
(1) CSP:KeyGen: We provide an improved key issuing
protocol between KA and CSP to execute the work of CSP.
KeyComKA$CSP(MSK1; IDt; r;MSK2). Assume that
user t needs a secret key. Firstly, KA randomly chooses a
number r 2 Zp for the user. Then, KA and CSP perform
a secure two-party computation (2PC) protocol, where KA
inputsMSK1 = f1; g and CSP inputsMSK2 = f2g. After
the execution of the 2PC protocol, CSP gets x = (1 + 2)
mod p. This can be done via a general 2PC protocol for a
simple arithmetic computation [10], [11], [20]. Alternatively,
we can do this more efficiently by using the construction in
[23]. Note that during the 2PC protocol, KA knows nothing
about 2 while CSP knows nothing about f1; g. After the
2PC protocol, KA and CSP engage the following interactive
protocol in order to generate the personalized key component
for the user:
1) CSP selects a random number 1 2 Zp. It calculates
X1 = g
x=1 = g(1+2)=1 and transmits fX1;PoK(1; x)g
to KA, where PoK represents a proof of knowledge of the
secret values used in the computation. It can be efficiently
realized, e.g. via Schnorr protocol.
2) KA chooses  2 Zp and computes Y1 = X=1 =
g(1+2)=1 and Y2 = hr. It sends fY1; Y2;PoK(; ; r)g
to CSP.
3) CSP randomly selects 2 2 Zp and computes X2 =
(Y 11 Y2)
2 = (g(1+2)hr)2 . It transfers fX2;PoK(2)g
to KA.
4) KA calculates Y3 = X
1=
2 = (g
(1+2)hr)2 and sends
fY3;PoK()g to CSP.
5) CSP calculates D = Y 1=23 = g
(1+2)hr = ghr and
sends a personalized key component SK2 = fD = ghrg to
the corresponding user t.
Fig. 5 provides a direct description for the above protocol.
Here the first step denotes a 2PC protocol which inputs f1; g
6from KA and f2g from CSP, and returns x = (1 + 2)
mod p to CSP.
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Fig. 5. The improved two-party key issuing protocol. “2PC” denotes a general
two-party computation protocol. “Pok” denotes a proof of knowledge of the
secret values used in the computation.
(2)KA:KeyGen(MSK1; r; S): KA executes the algorithm
which inputs MSK1, a number r 2 Zp which has randomly
chosen in CSP:KeyGen, and a set of weighted attributes S.
Then, for each weighted attribute j 2 S, it possesses weighted
value !j(!j 2 W ). Finally, it computes SK1 described by S
as the formula (4).
SK1 = fL = gr;8j 2 S : Dj = H(j)r!jg (4)
So, user t can construct the whole secret key SK by using
the key components separately receiving from the two entities.
It is described as the formula (5).
SK = fD = ghr; L = gr;8j 2 S : Dj = H(j)r!jg (5)
D. Data File Access (Data Decryption)
In cloud system, legal users can freely query the ciphertext.
When a user requests accessing a ciphertext to CSP, it transmits
the corresponding ciphertext fID;CT; Eck(M)g to the user.
The user can obtain content key ck by calling the improved
Users:Decrypt algorithm. Then, he uses ck to further de-
crypt the file M using Data:Decrypt operation. If not, he
cannot decrypt it.
(1) Users:Decrypt(PP;CT;SK): User inputs PP, CT,
and SK described by S. If the weighted attributes S that the
user possesses satisfy access policy T , the user can obtain
content key ck. The operation is a recursive algorithm which
is defined as below.
1) If x is a leaf node. Let k = att(x), !k be the weighted
value of the user’s node x, and !i be the weighted value of
the access policy T ’s node x. If k =2 S or k 2 S; !i > !k,
we note DecryptNode(CT;SK; x) = ?. If k 2 S and
!i = !k, we compute DecryptNode(CT;SK; x)1 as the
formula (6). If k 2 S, !i < !k and !k = !j , we compute
DecryptNode(CT;SK; x)2 as the formula (7).
DecryptNode(CT;SK; x)1
= e^(Cx; L)  e^(C;Dk)
= e^(hqx(0) H(att(x)) !is; gr)  e^(gs;H(k)r!k)
= e^(gqx(0); gr)  e^(H(k) !is; gr)  e^(gs;H(k)r!k)
= e^(g; g)rqx(0) (if !k = !i)
(6)
DecryptNode(CT;SK; x)2
= e^(Cx  Cx;j ; L)  e^(C;Dk)
= e^(hqx(0)H(att(x)) !isH(att(x)) (!j !i)s; gr)
 e^(gs;H(k)r!k)
= e^(gqx(0) H(k) !js; gr)  e^(gs;H(k)r!k)
= e^(gqx(0); gr)  e^(H(k) !js; gr)  e^(gs;H(k)r!k)
= e^(g; g)rqx(0) (if !k = !j > !i)
(7)
2) If x is a non-leaf node, DecryptNode(CT;SK; x) is
defined: for all nodes z that are children of x, it runs
DecryptNode(CT;SK; z) and stores the output as Fz . Let
Sx be an arbitrary kx-sized set of child nodes z such that
Fz 6= ?. If the nodes don’t exist, Fz = ?. If not, Fx
is computed as the formula (8), where k = index(z), and
S
0
x = findex(z) : z 2 Sxg.
Fx =
Y
z2Sx
F

k;S
0
x(0)
z
=
Y
z2Sx
(e^(g; g)rqz(0))

k;S
0
x(0)
=
Y
z2Sx
(e^(g; g)rqparent(z)(index(z)))

k;S
0
x(0)
=
Y
z2Sx
(e^(g; g)rqx(k))

k;S
0
x(0)
= e^(g; g)rqx(0)
(8)
Then, we define the decryption algorithm by calling
DecryptNode(CT;SK; x)1 or DecryptNode(CT;SK; x)2 on
the root node R of the access tree T . If the T is satisfied by S
we define A = DecryptNode(CT;SK; R) = e^(g; g)rqR(0) =
e^(g; g)rs. Thus, the user can gain ck with the formula (9).eC=(e^(C;D)=A) = eC=(e^(gs; g  hr)=e^(g; g)rs)
= ck  e^(g; g)s=e^(g; g)s
= ck
(9)
(2) Data:Decrypt(Eck(M); ck): User inputs file cipher-
text Eck(M) and content key ck. Based on symmetric de-
cryption algorithm, i.e., DES or AES, the file M can be
decrypted as the formula (10), where Dck denotes a symmetric
decryption operation with the key ck.
Dck[Eck(M)] =M (10)
E. Data File Deletion
Here, we show that data file deletion contains not only
discretionary deletion but also mandatory blocking.
Discretionary Deletion. All of the legal data owners can
freely delete ciphertext in cloud system. Assume that a DO
wants to delete an encrypted file, the procedures of algorithm
between DO and CSP are described as below, where the
algorithm can adopt any secure signature scheme such as BLS
7short signature scheme [24] as the underlying primitive to
achieve.
(1) DO sends a request to CSP, which includes file’s ID
and its signature on the ID.
(2) CSP verifies these request information. If validation, CSP
deletes the corresponding ciphertext. Otherwise, CSP will do
nothing.
Mandatory Blocking. To provide legal sharing environ-
ment, a new function, i.e., mandatory blocking, is added to
the proposed system. The steps are described as below.
(1) When accessing a file, user needs to evaluate how well
the file is accessed, such as shopping online and teaching
online.
(2) CSP synthesizes these assessments for each file. If some
files are not consistent with the evaluation standards, those
files would be mandatory blocked by CSP. Meanwhile, DO
will receive the private messages explaining the reason. If not,
CSP will do nothing.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze and compare the efficiency of
the proposed scheme with the schemes [11], [12], and [17] in
theoretical and experimental aspects.
A. Theoretical Analysis
1) Key Escrow and Weighted Attribute: Table I shows the
problems of key escrow and weighted attribute in each scheme
which will affect the security and practicability of cloud
system. The key escrow in CP-WABE-RE scheme can be
removed by using an improved key issuing protocol for cloud
computing. [11] uses escrow-free key issuing protocol to solve
the issue. On the contrary, both [12] and [17] don’t involve
the problem of key escrow. In addition, the weighted attribute
in CP-WABE-RE scheme can not only support arbitrary-
state attributes instead of the traditional binary state, but also
simplify access policy associated with a ciphertext as opposed
to [11] [12]. Unfortunately, [17] can only express arbitrary-
state attributes, and cannot simplify the access structure. In
Table I, we can find that only CP-WABE-RE scheme can
simultaneously support both the features and cloud system.
[11] solves the problem of key escrow so it can satisfy
environment of cloud system as ours. However, both [12] and
[17] cannot remove key escrow. Thus the both schemes cannot
be directly applied in cloud computing.
TABLE I. FEATURE COMPARISONS
Scheme Key Escrow Weighted Attribute Cloud System
CP-WABE-RE No Yes Yes
[11] No No Yes
[12] Yes No No
[17] Yes Yes No
2) Efficiency: In Table II and Table III, we compare ef-
ficiency of the above four schemes on storage overhead and
computation cost in theory, where the used symbols are defined
in Table IV.
To simplify the comparisons, access structure, data re-
encryption of [11] [12], and dynamic membership management
(that is, user joining, leaving, and attribute updating) of [17] are
not included in the following analysis. In addition, the cost of
transmission isn’t involved when implementing the interactive
protocols in both [11] and our proposed scheme.
TABLE IV. NOTATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS
Notation Definition
Gi exponentiation or multiplication in group (i = 0; T )
Ce^ e^ operation, e^ denotes bilinear pairing
Zp Group f0; 1; : : : ; p  1g under multiplication modulo p
S Least interior nodes satisfying an access structure
AC Attributes appeared in ciphertext CT
Au Attributes of user u
!i Maximum weight of attribute i in system
!i1 Weight of attribute i in ciphertext CT
n Number of attributes in system
k Number of users in system
L Bit-Length of element in *
j  j Number of elements in *
In Table II, the schemes are compared in terms of CT size,
SK size, PP size andMSK size. CT size represents the storage
overhead in cloud computing and implies the communication
cost from DO to CSP, or from CSP to users. SK size denotes
the required storage cost for each user. PP and MSK sizes
represent the storage overhead of KA and CSP in terms of
public parameter and master secret key.
As shown in Table II, when !i = !i1 , all attributes possess
equal weights in CP-WABE-RE scheme. Thus our scheme is
equivalent to [11] and [12]. Meanwhile, CT size is reduced
as (jAC j+ 1)LG0 + LGT in CP-WABE-RE scheme, which is
equal to [12]’s. Comparing with [11] and [17], the CT size
in our proposed scheme and [12] is reduced by nearly half.
When !i 6= !i1 , CP-WABE-RE scheme can use an attribute
to express (!i !i1+1) attributes which has different weights.
Therefore, it requires smaller storage cost in CT than the
others. Moreover, we can find that the SK size in CP-WABE-
RE scheme is equal to [12]’s, which is smaller than [11]’s and
[17]’s. Furthermore, when jAuj ! 1, the storage overhead in
our scheme is reduced by nearly half comparing to [11]’s. And
the storage cost in our scheme is decreased nearly by 66.67%
comparing to [17]’s in theory. In addition, we can also observe
that the PP size is equal among [11], [12], and CP-WABE-RE
scheme. And the size of PP in [17] is the longest since it is
related to the number of system attributes n and the number
of system users k. About the size of MSK, we can find that
the parameter in CP-WABE-RE scheme doesn’t appear to be
8TABLE II. EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS: STORAGE COST
Scheme Size of CT Size of SK Size of PP Size of MSK
CP-WABE-RE [jAC ji=1 (!i   !i1 + 1) + 1]LG0 + LGT (jAuj+ 2)LG0 3LG0 + LGT 3LZp
[11] (2jAC j+ 1)LG0 + LGT (2jAuj+ 1)LG0 3LG0 + LGT LZp + LG0
[12] (jAC j+ 1)LG0 + LGT (jAuj+ 2)LG0 3LG0 + LGT LG0
[17] 2(jAC j+ 1)LG0 + 2LGT (3jAuj+ 1)LG0 (n+ 2)LG0 + 2LGT + knLZp LG0
TABLE III. EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS: COMPUTATION COST
Scheme New File Creation Cost Data File Access Cost New User Authorization Cost
CP-WABE-RE f[jAC ji=1 (!i   !i1 + 2)] + 1gG0 + 2GT (2jAuj+ 1)Ce^ + (2jSj+ 2)GT (jAuj+ 9)G0
[11] (2jAC j+ 1)G0 + 2GT (2jAuj+ 1)Ce^ + (2jSj+ 2)GT (2jAuj+ 4)G0
[12] (2jAC j+ 1)G0 + 2GT (2jAuj+ 1)Ce^ + (2jSj+ 2)GT (jAuj+ 3)G0
[17] (2jAC j+ 2)G0 + 3GT (3jAuj+ 1)Ce^ + (2jSj+ 3)GT (4jAuj+ 2)G0
much different from the others.
In Table III, we evaluate the computation cost of encryption,
decryption and key generation. During the new file creation
(data encryption), the computation cost in CP-WABE-RE
scheme can be reduced as (2jAC j + 1)G0 + 2GT when
!i = !i1 , which is roughly equal to [11]’s, [12]’s, and
[17]’s. Similar to Table II, when !i 6= !i1 , CP-WABE-RE
scheme computes an attribute to represent multiple attributes
which possess different weights. Meanwhile, it can simplify
access structure associated with a ciphertext. However, the
scheme [17] doesn’t possess the feature of our scheme, without
expressing arbitrary-state attributes. So, when !i 6= !i1 , the
encryption cost in CP-WABE-RE scheme is saved. About data
file access (data decryption) cost, the parameter is equal in
[11], [12], and CP-WABE-RE scheme. And the decryption cost
in [17] is larger than the others. In addition, in the phase of new
user authorization (user key generation), our proposed scheme
only consumes additional 6G0 of computation cost in solving
key escrow issue, comparing with that in [12]. Meanwhile,
the key generation cost in CP-WABE-RE scheme is smaller
than [11]’s and [17]’s. Furthermore, when jAuj ! 1, the
computation cost in ours is decreased nearly by 50% in theory
than [11]’s, where the cost of transmission isn’t involved in
the two schemes. At the same time, the cost in ours is reduced
by nearly 75% comparing to [17]’s in theory.
B. Experimental Analysis
Now, to validate theoretical analysis proposed in previous
subsection, we execute CP-WABE-RE scheme by using the
cpabe toolkit and the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography library
(JPBC) [25]. Meanwhile, we also simulate the schemes in
[11], [12], and [17] at the same condition. The following
experiments are conducted using Java on the system with
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU at 3.30 GHz and 8.00GB
RAM running Windows 7. To achieve a 80-bit security level,
the experiments use a 160-bit elliptic curve group based on
the supersingular curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512-bit finite
field. In addition, all the simulation results are the mean of 10
trials. The units of storage cost and time are Kilobyte (KB)
and second (s).
1) Simulation Analysis of Key Escrow: The storage overhead
and computation cost of user secret key are compared as
plotted in Fig. 6. The number of weighted attributes used in
this simulation is N = f10; 20; 30; 40; 50g.
Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) intuitively show the experimental
results. We find that the storage overhead of user secret key
in ours is the same as [12]’s, and it is smaller than [11]’s
and [17]’s under the same number of attributes. About the
computation cost of secret key, the value of our scheme is
larger than [12]’s, where the difference of key generation
cost is 6G0 according to the above Table III. At the same
time, the parameter in CP-WABE-RE scheme is smaller than
[11]’s and [17]’s at the same condition. We also observe
that all experimental results are gradually increasing and
approximately follow a linear relationship with the number of
weighted attributes. Therefore, with a small error tolerance, we
estimate their limit values, where the mathematical expressions
are computed by using the mean algorithm. When N ! 1,
the limit value of space saving in CP-WABE-RE scheme is
approximately equal to 48.39% comparing to [11]’s. The cost
is reduced by nearly half in theory which is consistent with
the above efficiency analysis. Comparing with our scheme and
[17], the saved storage cost is approximately 64.47% which
matches the corresponding limit value in theory. In addition,
when N ! 1, comparing with CP-WABE-RE scheme and
[11], the maximum of improved efficiency in computation cost
approaches to 23.04%. Comparing with our scheme and [17],
the reduced computation cost is approximate to 64.88% in Fig.
6(b). However, in Table III, if jAuj ! 1, the corresponding
computation cost can be reduced to 50% and 75% in theory,
where the cost of transmission isn’t involved. Remarkably,
the cost of transmission comes from the difference between
theoretical value and experimental result.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of experimental results of key escrow. (a)The storage cost of secret key. (b)The time cost of new user authorization. The coordinate is
storage overhead or time cost of user’s secret key. The abscissa is the number of weighted attributes in user secret key.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of experimental results of weighted attribute. (a)The storage cost of ciphertext. (b)The time cost of new file creation. The abscissa is
the number of attributes appeared in ciphertext. The coordinate is storage overhead or time cost of encryption at DO.
2) Simulation Analysis of Weighted Attribute: Next, we
measure and analyze the storage overhead and computation
cost for encrypting (by a DO) data, where the number of
attributes in access policy is N = f10; 20; 30; 40; 50g. It
should be noticed that the CP-WABE-RE scheme is equivalent
to the schemes in [11] and [12] when all attributes possess
equal weights (!i = !i1 ), where it has been analyzed in Table
II and Table III. For simplicity, we have omitted the simulation
when !i = !i1 . To show the advantage of the weighted
attribute here, in CP-WABE-RE scheme, the maximum value
of each weighted attribute is set to be 5, and the lowest
value of each weighted attribute is chosen to encrypt. We
implement [11], [12], [17], and our proposed scheme under
the equivalent access policy encrypted in ciphertext. Fig. 7
shows the simulation results.
Fig. 7(a) plots the relationship between the storage overhead
of ciphertext and the number of weighted attributes in access
policy. Fig. 7(b) shows encryption time of ciphertext versus
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the number of weighted attributes. When !i 6= !i1 (here we
assume that an attribute can be represented 5 attributes which
possess different weights), we find that CP-WABE-RE scheme
requires less storage cost and encryption time than the others.
We also observe that all results approximately follow a linear
relationship with the number of weighted attribute in access
trees. Similar as the analysis of Fig. 6, we estimate the limit
values with a small error tolerance, where the mathematical
expressions are computed by using the mean algorithm. For
example, in Fig. 7(a), when N ! 1, comparing with CP-
WABE-RE scheme and [11], the limit value of space saving is
approximately equal to 52.60%. Similarly, the reduced storage
cost in ciphertext is 11.77% comparing our scheme to [12].
And comparing with [17], our proposed scheme can save
storage cost approximate to 51.71%. In addition, the reduced
storage cost in [12] approaches to 46.28% comparing to [11].
In Fig. 7(b), when N ! 1, CP-WABE-RE scheme can save
computation cost approximate to 61.68% comparing with [11],
[12], and [17], where the computation cost associated with a
ciphertext in [11] is approximately equal to [12]’s and [17]’s.
It indicates that the results are consistent with the theoretical
analysis presented in previous subsection.
VI. SECURITY PROOF
We first present the chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) security
proof of our CP-WABE-RE scheme. The security game is
identical to those of traditional (fully) CP-ABE systems. We
state here the definition of an adaptive CP-ABE security game
for the completeness of the security analysis.
1) System Initi. The challenger runs the operations
of KA:Setup and CSP:Setup of CP-WABE-RE
scheme and sends public parameter PP to the adversary
A.
2) Phase 1. For the attribute sets S1; : : : ; Sq1(8i 2
[1; : : : ; q1]) chosen by A, he can repeatedly ask C
for the secret key SK. Meanwhile, the challenger an-
swers the secret key SK by running the algorithms of
CSP:KeyGen and KA:KeyGen.
3) Challenge. A submits two equal length messages
M0;M1 2 GT and an access tree A to the challenger,
where there should not be any secret key issued to A
such that the key satisfies A. The challenger randomly
picks a bit  2 f0; 1g and encryptsM with A by using
the algorithm DO:Encrypt.
4) Phase 2. Same as the Phase 1 but with the restriction
that the querying key cannot satisfy A.
5) Guess. A outputs a guess ^ of . In this game, A can
win the game which is defined as jPr[^ = ]  (1=2)j.
Definition 2. The proposed scheme is said to be secure against
CPA if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries have non-
negligible advantage in the above game.
We use the generic bilinear group model and the random
oracle model to prove that no adversary can break the CPA
security of our scheme with non-negligible probability. In other
words, our security is reduced to mathematical properties of
elliptic curve groups as well as security of target collision
resistance hash function. We note that our security proof
technique follows that of [4].
Consider two random encodings 0, 1 of an additive group
Fp, which is injective maps 0; 1 : Fp ! f0; 1gm, where
m > 3log(p). We set G0 = f0(x) : x 2 Fpg and GT =
f1(x) : x 2 Fpg. In the security game, the simulator is given
a random oracle for simulating hash function, and oracles in
groups G0;GT and bilinear map e^ : G0  G0 ! GT for
computation queries. We are also given a random oracle to
represent the hash function H . And we refer to G0 as a generic
bilinear group. Below, we give a lower bound on the advantage
of a generic adversary in breaking the security of our scheme.
Theorem 1. For any adversary A, let q be a bound on the total
number of group elements which A receives from queries to
the oracles for the hash function, groups G0, GT , the bilinear
map e^ and from its interaction with the security game, in which
G0 is bilinear group of prime order p with generator g. We
have that the advantage of A in the game is O(q2=p).
Proof. In the challenge phase of a CP-ABE game, the
simulator will construct either M0e^(g; g)s or M1e^(g; g)s as
the component ~C. Here, we consider a modified game where
~C is either e^(g; g)s or e^(g; g), and  2R Fp. Now, the
adversary is required to tell if ~C = e^(g; g)s or e^(g; g). It
is not difficult to see that the modified game can be regarded
as a hybrid argument in which the adversary is asked to tell
e^(g; g) from M0e^(g; g)s, and e^(g; g) from M1e^(g; g)s.
Accordingly, an adversary in the CP-ABE game with advan-
tage  is transformed into an adversary A in the modified game
with advantage at least 2 . Below we let g = 0(1), g
x = 0(x)
and e^(g; g)x = 1(x).
1) System Initi. The simulator chooses 1; 2;  2R Fp,
and next sets h = g , u1 = e^(g; g)1 , v1 = g1 , u2 =
e^(g; g)2 , v2 = g2 and  = 1 + 2. It further sends
the PP = fg; h; u = u1u2g to A.
2) Hash Queries. If A issues a hash query on an attribute
att(y), the simulator returns gti and stores (ti; att(y))
into ListH , where ti 2R Fp.
3) Key Queries. Here we combine the simulations of the
algorithms CSP.KeyGen and KA.KeyGen as one key
query. We note that it will not bring additional advan-
tage for A in winning the game. When A queries a user
i’s secret key for an attribute set S, the simulator works
as follows. It chooses ri; wj 2R Fp, and computes
D = ggri , L = gri , 8 j 2 S : Dj = H(j)riwj .
The simulator finally sends the secret key to A and
stores (SK; i; S) into ListSK .
4) Challenge. A outputs two equal length messages
M0;M1 2 GT and an access tree A to the simulator,
where there should not be any secret key issued to A
such that the key satisfies A. The simulator chooses an
s 2R Fp, and next uses linear secret sharing technique
to construct shares y of s for all attributes y in A as
in the algorithm DO.Encrypt, where y is uniformly
and independently random in Fp, and y can be seen as
a linear combination of independent random variables
(in Fp) and s. The simulator then chooses  2R Fp,
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and sets ~C = e^(g; g), C = gs, 8 y 2 Y; i 2
[1; n], Cy = giH(att(y)) wis, and 8j 2 (1; n],
Cy;j = H(att(y))
 (wj wi)s, where wi; wj 2R Fp. The
simulator sends the challenge ciphertext to A.
5) Key Queries. Same as the previous key queries phase
but with the restriction that the querying key cannot
satisfy A.
6) Guess. A outputs a guess bit.
Below we consider unexpected collision. An oracle query
can be seen as a rational function # = = in the variables
, , , ti, wi, ri, i and s. Suppose there are two distinct
rational functions # = = and #0 = 0= 0. An unexpected
collision event indicates that taking two different queries
corresponding to the two functions, we have the same output
due to random choice of variables. If the event happens, it
means that # = #0, and further  0   0 = 0. By the
Schwartz-Zippel Lemma in [26], [27], the probability of the
event is O(1=p). Therefore, the probability of a collision event
is at most O(q2=p). Accordingly, the unexpected collision will
not occur in the simulations with probability 1 O(q2=p).
Remember that each group element is uniformly and de-
pendently chosen in the above simulations. A can tell the
difference between  and s elements in GT if there are two
distinct queries # and #0 leading to the same output. Assume
#0 = 0 and # = s, we have # #0 = s 0 such that
0 + #   #0 = s, where ; 0 are non-zero constant. We
will show that A cannot construct a query for s in GT .
We here observe all possible rational function queries in
GT by means of bilinear map and the group elements given
to A. It can be seen that A can obtain a transcript fg, g , gs,
gig tiwis, g (wj wi)sti , ggr, gr, grwitig from one query.
For another transcript, we set it as fg, g , gs, gi0 g ti0wi0s,
g (wj0 wi0 )sti0 , ggr
0
, gr
0
, gr
0wi0 ti0g. We first ignore g since
the elements with  will be tagged with  which is irrelevant
to s. To output a factor s, we should focus on elements
with factors  and s. It is not difficult to see that there are
three types of outputs with s in GT from two transcripts.
One is s+rs (resp. s+r0s). To output s, we need an
element rs. However the element does not exist. The second
format with s is ( wj +wi)tis+( wj +wi)stir0 (resp.
( wj0 + wi0)ti0s + ( wj0 + wi0)sti0r). To eliminate the
part right after +, we need to concentrate on the elements
with ti. The elements with i   tiwis, and rwiti fail to
construct a cancel-out part as they are lack of a factor wj . For
the element  (wj wi)sti, we need an element with r0 (resp.
r). But none of other elements satisfy our requirement. The
last format with s is  tiwis+ 2ir0   tiwisr0 + i
(resp.  ti0wi0s+ 2i0r  ti0wi0sr+i0). If we cannot
find elements to cancel out all of terms except for that of s, it
indicates that A fails to construct s. For simplicity, we only
check with the last term i. It can be seen that +r is the
only element with . Thus, we need a i term. Nevertheless,
the term does not exist.
From the above observation, we can therefore state that A
fails to construct the query form s.
In addition, an improved key issuing protocol is proposed
to resolve the key escrow problem of CP-ABE in cloud
computing. In this paper, we assume that they do not collude
with each other to share their master secret keys. We say that
our proposed key issuing protocol is secure when the following
two aspects are satisfied. The first one is that the KA cannot
derive the user secret key if the CSP is honest. The other is
that the CSP cannot derive the user secret key while the KA
is honest. Security analysis about the protocol is described as
below.
Theorem 2. The proposed key issuing protocol in section
IV-C is a secure protocol for computing ghr by KA and
CSP. Assume that the underlying arithmetic 2PC and zero
knowledge proofs are secure, and (for security against corrupt
CSP) that DDH is hard.
Proof. First, to note that D = Y 1=23 = X
1=2
2 =
(Y 11 Y2)
1= = X
1=
1 h
r = g1+2hr = ggr. To show the
security we consider the cases of corrupting KA and corrupting
CSP respectively.
(1) For a corrupted KA, our simulator proceeds as follows:
SimC : First, it will run the arithmetic 2PC simulator for
computation of (1 + 2). In the process, it will extract 1.
Next, the simulator will choose random values X1 2 G0, and
send it to KA. It will receive Y1 and Y2 from the adversary KA,
and two corresponding zero knowledge proofs. We will extract
 and r from the corresponding proofs. Then, it will send 1,
 and r to the trusted party, and receive g2 g1+r = g+r,
which will be CSP’s secret key output.
Consider a hybrid simulator HybC that takes as input of
CSP’s secret 2. It first runs the arithmetic 2PC simulator for
the computation of x with the correct output value according
to 2. Then the simulator completes the protocol as the honest
CSP would do. This is clearly indistinguishable from the real
CSP’s protocol by the security of the arithmetic 2PC.
Now, assuming that the proof of knowledge scheme is
secure, HybC should be indistinguishable from the above sim-
ulator SimC . This is because the value X1 used by SimC will
be distributed identically to those inHybC . (Since 1 is chosen
at random in the real protocol,X1 will be distributed uniformly
over G0 in the real protocol as in the simulated protocol.)
Thus, interaction with our simulation is indistinguishable from
interaction with an honest CSP.
(2) For a corrupted CSP, our simulator proceeds as follows:
SimK : First, it will run the arithmetic 2PC simulator for
computation of (1 + 2). This 2PC will extract 2 from
CSP and output x = (2 + 1) mod p. We will choose
a random value x 2 Zp, and give it to the arithmetic 2PC
simulator. Note that this is correctly distributed, since there is
some  such that x = (2 + 1) mod p for any x; 1; 2.
Next, our simulator will receive X1 from the adversary, and
the corresponding zero knowledge proof. 1 is extracted by the
proof system. We will select random values Y1; Y2 2 G0, and
send them to CSP. (Again, this will be distributed exactly as in
a real execution.) We will receive X2 from the adversary, and
use the corresponding proof to extract 2. Then, it will send 2
to the trusted party, and receive D = g2  g1+r = g+r.
Finally, it will compute Y3 = D2 and send it to CSP.
Consider a hybrid simulator HybK that takes as input of
KA’s secrets 1,  and r. It will compute x = (2 + 1)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using the arithmetic 2PC simulator. When the 2PC simulator
provides 2 and asks for output, it will correctly compute
(2 + 1). Then it will complete the execution as in the
real protocol. This protocol is clearly indistinguishable from
the real KA’s protocol by security of the arithmetic 2PC.
In addition, we consider a second hybrid Hyb
0
K which is the
same as the HybK to proceed the above protocol, but which
uses the zero-knowledge simulator for all proofs of knowledge.
This must be indistinguishable by the zero-knowledge property
of the proof system. Here we only need show that the Hyb
0
K is
indistinguishable from the interaction with the above simulator.
Consider the reduction from DDH assumption: Given g,
A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, and we must decide whether c = ab
or c 2R Zp. Here we define X1 = A = ga and h = g for
 2R Zp. As the SimK, we run the arithmetic 2PC simulator
for computation of (1 + 2) and extraction 2. Next we
receive X1 = A and extract 1 from the corresponding proof.
Meanwhile, we compute Y1 = X
=
1 = g
a= = C1= ,
Y2 = h
r = gr = Br, and send them to the adversary
CSP, along with a simulated proof of knowledge. Then we
receive X2 and extract 2 from the proof. At last, we compute
Y3 = X
1=
2 = (A
1=  gr)2 and send it to CSP.
Here we assume that the proofs of knowledge are secure.
If c = ab, Y1, Y2, Y3 will be distributed correctly, and this
will be distinguishable from Hyb
0
K . If c is a random number
(that is, c 2R Zp), then Y1; Y2 are randomly selected from G0,
as in SimK. Thus, any adversary that can distinguish Hyb
0
K
from SimK will allow us to resolve DDH problem. Under the
DDH assumption, interaction with SimK is indistinguishable
from interaction with a real KA.
Thus, our construction is a secure two-party key issuing
protocol.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we revisited an attribute-based data shar-
ing scheme in cloud computing. The improved key issuing
protocol was presented to resolve the key escrow problem.
It enhances data confidentiality and privacy in cloud system
against the managers of KA and CSP as well as malicious
system outsiders, where KA and CSP are semi-trusted. In
addition, the weighted attribute was proposed to enhance the
expression of attribute, which can not only describe arbitrary-
state attributes, but also reduce the complexity of access
policy, so that the storage cost of ciphertext and time cost in
encryption can be saved. Finally, we presented the performance
and security analyses for the proposed scheme, in which the
results demonstrate high efficiency and security of our scheme.
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